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«Nous» est performatif; «nous» à sa seule prononciation crée un 
groupe; «nous» désigne une généralité de personne comprenant 
celui qui parle, et celui qui parle peut parler en leur nom, leurs 
liens sont si forts que celui qui parle peut parler pour tous. 
Alexis Jenny, L’art français de la guerre, p.36. Gallimard, 2011 
 
Abstract. Deliberation is an argumentative practice in which several parties reason in order to decide the 
best available course of action. I argue that deliberation, unlike negotiation, requires a collective agency, 
defined by shared commitments, and not merely a plural agency defined by aggregation of individual 
commitments. Since the “we” presupposed by this argumentative genre is built up in the course of the 
deliberation exchange itself, shaping collective identity is a basic function of public deliberation. 
 
Keywords. Argumentative practice, collective agency, dialogue, identity negotiation, in-group, 
negotiation, proposal, public deliberation, social identity. 
 
1. Introduction 
I will be concerned here with deliberation as an argumentative, communicational practice, 
thus leaving aside deliberation as an exercise of private prudential reasoning (NE. 
1140a25-27). As a communicative practice, deliberation can be either interpersonal 
communication, within a reduced group, whose members successively play the role of 
proponent and opponent and try to reach a decision, or mass communication, involving 
mass media, in which the debaters  interact for a larger audience. I will consider both 
types of public deliberation. 
There is consensus that deliberation is a distinctive argumentative practice in 
which several parties reason together on how to proceed when they are confronted by a 
practical problem or any need to consider taking a course of action, in order to decide the 
best available course of action. Deliberation is also the paradigm of argumentation in the 
public sphere. Distinctive features of deliberation include that it is neither about 
propositions nor about offers, but about proposals for action, (Kock, Ihnen Jory), that 
audience members must subjectively compare and balance pro and con arguments 
(Kock), that pragmatic argumentation is the prevalent argument scheme (Fairclough), etc. 
Relying on previous work by Luis Vega, I will explore another distinctive feature 
of deliberation; namely, deliberation, unlike other argumentative practices as negotiation, 
requires a collective agency, defined by shared commitments, and not merely a plural 
agency defined by aggregation of individual commitments. While we can assume that 
plural agents are simply there, the same don’t applies to collective agents. I hold that the 
 
1 This work was supported by FEDER/Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, Agencia Estatal 
de Investigación, as part of the project PGC2018-095941-B-I00 Argumentative practices and the 
pragmatics of reasons (Parg_Praz). 
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“we” presupposed by this argumentative genre is built up in the course of the deliberation 
exchange itself. As a consequence, if I am right, shaping collective identity is a basic 
function of public deliberation. 
 
Deliberations as a type of dialogue. 
The interest for the argumentative practice of deliberation comes largely from the fact 
that, according to most theorist, deliberation is the paradigmatic form of argumentation 
in politics, and more generally in the public sphere. The concept of public sphere comes 
from Habermas and designates the social space in which citizens ask for, exchange and 
receive reasons for political measures, policies and laws that should be enforced from a 
wide range of political perspectives. 
The concept of dialogue provides a tool for the classification of the different 
argumentative practices. In contemporary dialectic a dialogue is a ruled exchange of 
arguments between two or more parties oriented towards the achievement of a shared 
goal. Therefore, a particular kind of dialogue is distinguished by its intended goal, by its 
rules, and by the roles played by the participants. 
 To go further into this preliminary definition of dialogue we have to say something 
about the purposes and goals of arguing. Purposes belong to the participants; goals belong 
to the argumentative context of dialogue. To be precise, purposes belong to the roles 
played by the participants, not to the individuals playing them. (A role can be defined as 
a socially expected behavior pattern determined by an individual's status in a particular 
group). The purpose of the defense attorney is to get her client acquitted; however, it may 
be the case that the purpose of Smith, the dishonest defense lawyer of Brown, be to get 
her convicted. 
 The proper function of arguing is to present to someone something as a reason for 
something else. Hence the primary purpose of the arguer is that the addressee perceives 
something as a reason for something else. This primary purpose may be accompanied by 
other secondary purposes, such as the addressee adopting a belief, an intention or an 
attitude as a consequence of her perceiving something as a reason for another thing.  
 The common goal of any exchange of reasons, that gives sense to the actions of 
the participants, is to critically examine an issue -i.e., or consider the merits and demerits 
of and judge accordingly. This general goal can be instrumental for the achievement of 
further particular goals, such as: clarifying an issue, solving a difference of opinion, 
coming to an agreement, etc. While the general goal and the primary purposes of the 
participants make it possible to distinguish argumentative exchanges from other forms of 
communicative exchanges, particular goals and secondary purposes make it possible to 
distinguish one type of argumentative exchange from another type of argumentative 
exchange. Thus argumentative exchanges are classified according to their particular goals 
and the participants’ secondary purposes.  
An argumentative exchange is a practice, and therefore a rule-governed activity. 
As John Rawls writes, the word "practice" is used here as “a sort of technical term 
meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, 
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moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure” (1955, 
fn.1). This system of rules is externally justified by its capacity to promote the 
achievement of the rules. In an exchange there can be different stages, defined by the 
entitlements and obligations the rules impose to the participants. 
 Walton & Krabbe (1995) recognize six basic types of argumentative exchanges or 
dialogues: inquiry, negotiation dialogue, information-seeking dialogue, deliberation, and 
eristic dialogue. Later Walton has added discovery dialogue as a seventh type of basic 
dialogue. This classification is based on three aspects: the initial situation, the 
participants’ purposes and the goal of the dialogue. 
 
TYPE OF 
DIALOGUE  
INITIAL 
SITUATION  
PARTICIPANT’S 
PURPOSES  
GOAL OF 
DIALOGUE  
Information-
Seeking  
Need Information  Acquire or Give 
Information  
Exchange 
Information  
Deliberation  Dilemma or 
Practical Choice  
Co-ordinate Goals 
and Actions  
Decide Best 
Available Course of 
Action  
Discovery  Need to Find an 
explanation of 
Facts  
Find and Defend a 
Suitable Hypothesis  
Choose Best 
Hypothesis for 
Testing  
Eristic  Personal Conflict  Verbally Hit Out at 
Opponent  
Reveal Deeper Basis 
of Conflict  
Inquiry  Need to Have 
Proof  
Find and Verify 
Evidence  
Prove (Disprove) 
Hypothesis  
Negotiation  Conflict of 
Interests  
Get What You Most 
Want  
Reasonable 
Settlement Both Can 
Live With  
Persuasion  Conflict of 
Opinions  
Persuade Other Party  Resolve or Clarify 
Issue  
 
These are the basic types of dialogue; in addition, there are mixed types of dialogue that 
combine many stages corresponding to different basic types. Furthermore other authors 
have described other types of basic dialogues, such as exploratory dialogue (Mercer 
2004): an exploratory dialogue starts from the need to delimit a standpoint, the purpose 
of the participants is the joint exploration of the scope and consequences of this 
standpoint, to reach an agreement on its definition and scope. 
A related, though different, concept to that of dialogue type is that of activity type, 
which van Eemeren and Houtlosser define as 
conventionalized practices whose conventionalization serves, through the 
implementation of certain genres of communicative activity the institutional needs 
prevailing in a certain domain of communicative activity (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 
2010, p. 139).2 
 
2 For a detailed comparison of both concepts see Lewinski (2010). 
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In turn, they define, quoting Fairclough, genres of communicative activity as socially 
ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity 
(Ibid.). Thus, presidential debate, general debate in parliament and Prime Minister’s 
Question Time are activity types of the genre of communicative activity deliberation. 
A general classification of activity types is based on four factors: initial situation, 
starting points, means of argumentation and criticism, and possible outcome. These four 
factors correspond to the four stages of critical discussion (confrontation, opening, 
argumentation and conclusion). An additional feature, that occupies a prominent place in 
Isabela Fairclough’s account of deliberation, as we shall see, is that each activity type can 
be associated with some speech events on the basis of careful empirical observation of 
argumentative practice (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005, p. 384). 
GENRES 
OF 
COMMUNI
CATIVE 
ACTIVITY 
INITIAL 
SITUATION 
PROCEDURAL 
AND 
MATERIAL 
STARTING 
POINTS 
ARGUMENTATION 
MEANS AND  
CRITICISMS 
POSSIBLE 
OUTCOME 
Adjudication 
dispute 
3rd party 
with 
jurisdiction 
to decide 
 
Largely explicit 
codified rules 
Explicitly established 
concessions; 
argumentation from facts 
and concessions 
interpreted in terms of 
conditions for the 
application of a legal rule 
Settlement of 
the dispute by 
sustained 
decision 3rd 
party (no return 
to initial 
situation)  
Deliberation Mixed 
disagreement 
dispute; 3rd 
party with 
jurisdiction 
to decide 
Largely implicit 
intersubjective 
rules; explicit 
and implicit 
concessions on 
both sides 
Argumentation defending 
incompatible standpoints 
in critical exchanges 
Resolution 
difference of 
opinion for (part 
of) 3rd party 
audience (or 
confirmed return 
to initial 
situation) 
Mediation Conflict at 
deadlock; 3rd 
party 
intervening 
without 
jurisdiction 
to decide 
parties 
conflict 
Implicitly 
enforced 
regulative rules; 
no explicitly 
recognized 
concessions 
Argumentation conveyed 
in would-be spontaneous 
conversational exchanges 
Mutually 
accepted 
conclusion by 
mediated 
arrangement 
between 
conflicting 
parties (or 
provisional 
return to initial 
situation) 
Negotiation Conflict of 
interests; 
decision up 
to the parties 
Semi-explicit 
constitutive 
rules; sets of 
conditional and 
changeable 
explicit 
concessions 
Argumentation 
incorporated in 
exchanges of offers, 
counteroffers and other 
commissives 
Conclusion by 
compromise 
parties as 
mutually 
accepted 
agreement (or 
return to initial 
situation) 
Some genres of communicative activity (Lewinski 2010, p. 57). 
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To sum up, deliberation appears as a type of basic dialogue, in which the shared 
commitment to a goal arises from a situation in which several agents must jointly choose 
from several alternatives, that either may be given in advance, or may be built in the 
course of the dialogue. Agents examine the issue, asking for, giving and appraising 
reasons in order to determine which is the best available course of action. To understand 
what is meant here by “the best available decision” we need some details about the initial 
situation, the aim of the exchange and the purposes of the participants. In an archetypical 
deliberation, participants don’t start from previously taken positions and try to make the 
others embrace them. When this happens, there is a conflict of opinions and the result is 
rather a persuasion dialogue. 
 Even if one of the participants may have an initial preference for some particular 
alternative, her role is not to defend it but to collaborate with the other participants in 
examining the pros and cons of the available options in order to take a joint decision. The 
rules of a particular type of deliberation can assign the defense of some particular option 
to some of the participants, but this obligation must be understood from the shared 
commitment of jointly examining all the available options. Assigning to each participant 
the defense of a different option can be an efficient way to ensure that the group examines 
in a fair and unbiased manner the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Therefore, 
in a deliberation dialogue the best policy is the best policy for us, for the deliberative 
group as a whole. 
Thus, deliberation does not start from a conflict of opinions or interests, but from 
the need to find a joint solution for a common problem, and this feature differentiates 
deliberation from both persuasion and negotiation, making it more akin to inquiry. From 
the point of view of the nature of the question at stake, a distinction is usually drawn 
between three forms of reasoning and argumentation. When it is a matter of fact, 
argumentation is factual, when it is a matter of value, argumentation is valuational, and 
when it is a matter of choice, argumentation is practical. According to this classification, 
in deliberation argumentation is practical while in in inquiry argumentation is factual. 
Deliberation, proposals and weighing values. 
Most contemporary treatments of deliberation have two main sources. Walton & 
Krabbe’s model of deliberative dialogue is one of them; the other is Christian Kock’s 
analysis of political debate. 
Deliberation, according to Kock (2007) is a distinctive type of argumentation 
characterized by five interrelated features:  
(1) It is about proposals for action, not about propositions that may have a truth value. 
(2) There may be good arguments on both sides. 
(3) Neither the proposal nor its rejection follows by necessity or inference. 
(4) The pros and the cons generally cannot be aggregated in an objective way. 
(5) Eventual consensus between the debaters is not a reasonable requirement.  
The first feature defines deliberation as a form of practical argumentation, and it is already 
implicit in Walton & Krabbe’s account of deliberation as a type of dialogue. A proposition 
is the semantic content of an act of assertion, and as such it can be true or false. A proposal 
is the semantic content of a directive or a commisive act, and consequently it cannot be 
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true or false, but rather more or less convenient. Hence deliberation is no about what is 
true or false, but about what is convenient or inconvenient. These are Searle (1975, pp. 
354-356) definitions of assertive, directive and commisive speech acts: 
• The point or purpose of assertive speech acts is to commit the speaker (in varying 
degrees) to something' s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. 
• The illocutionary point of directive speech acts in the fact that they are attempts 
(of varying degrees) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. 
• Commissives are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker 
(again in varying degrees) to some future course of action. 
Kock derives from this feature the next two. Arguments about proposals are arguments 
about the positive and negative consequences of an action. As most, if not all, actions 
have both negative and positive consequences, there will often be good arguments in 
favor and against one and the same proposal. Moreover if we assume, following the model 
of deductive logic, that a proposition is deducible from a set of propositions if and only 
the truth of these propositions entails the truth of the former proposition, and then, since 
a proposal cannot be neither true nor false, to say that a proposal can (or cannot) be 
deduced from a set of propositions is plain nonsense. 
 The coexistence of good reasons in favor and against a proposal makes weighing 
a core constituent of practical argumentation. Kock assumes that in order to evaluate a 
factual argument it suffices to examine its premises and their relationship to the 
conclusion, while the appraisal of a practical argument (and most probably the appraisal 
of a valuational argument) requires balancing its strength with that of the other concurrent 
arguments. If so, (logically) good factual argument would be classificatory or qualitative 
concept, while (logically) good practical argument would be a topological or comparative 
argument.  
 It follows from the above that balancing the strength of two practical arguments 
consists in balancing the pros and cons of two courses of action. In order to determine if 
and to what extent a consequence of an action is an advantage or a drawback, people 
resort to such values as political equality, efficient organization, social justice or 
individual liberty, that constitute the warrants that deliberative argumentation relies on. 
 Value pluralism would not be a major difficulty in deliberation if these values 
were not incommensurable, in the sense that there are no common basis for determining, 
in given situations, the respective weights of the conflicting commitments. Value 
pluralism is superficial if the conflicting values may both be converted into a common 
denominator; but it is profound if the arguments relying on the conflicting values are not 
rankable with respect to a common denominator of value. As a result, in deliberative 
argumentation there may be no objective or intersubjective way to determine which side 
outweighs the other. 
 […] since there is no intersubjectively compelling reasoning determining such 
choices (and if there were, they would not be choices), they are in fact subjective. 
In deliberative debate over a proposal to go to war each legislator and, ideally, 
each citizen, must choose individually (‘subjectively’) which policy to support. 
This is so not because ‘truth’ is subjective […]  but because the values that 
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function as warrants in deliberation are subjective as well as incommensurable. 
(Kock 2007, p. 237). 
If weighing of practical arguments is subjective and argumentation is the place where 
subjective preferences become intersubjective reasons through public critical scrutiny, 
weighing and meta-argumentative weighing fall outside the domain of deliberation. Kock 
goes on to conclude that it cannot be expected, not even as a theoretical ideal, neither that 
deliberation will lead towards consensus, nor that reaching consensus is the goal of 
deliberation. argumentation.  
But if not consensus, what could then be the purpose of proponents of different 
policies engaging in deliberative debate? Kock holds that the main reason why such 
debates are potentially meaningful is that other individuals facing such a choice may hear, 
consider and compare the arguments relating to the choice (Op.cit., p.238). This view of 
deliberation is in accordance to van Eeemeren and Houtlosser’s account of deliberation 
as an activity type given. Thus, deliberation fulfills the function of bringing into light the 
relevant considerations for some decision, that then everyone will rank according to their 
personal criteria.  
For Walton & Krabbe, as we have seen, the goal of deliberation is to jointly decide 
the best available course of action on a matter of common concern. By contrast, for Kock, 
the goal of deliberation is to ensure that those who have to decide individually on a matter 
of common interest can access all the relevant information, and in any case the same 
information. Hence the goal of deliberation is to warrant information publicity and 
accessibility -what is usually taken to be a regulatory condition for sound deliberation. 
Moreover, in Kock’s model a third party is added, so that deliberation, from being a two-
role dialogue (proponent and opponent), becomes a three-role dialogue (proponent, 
opponent and audience). These differences are probably due to the fact that Kock, on one 
side, Walton and Krabbe, on the other side, are thinking in different species of 
deliberation. While Kock is probably thinking of macrodeliberation (remember that Kock 
deals with political debate as a distinctive domain in argumentation), Walton and 
Krabbe’s deliberative dialogue is designed to account for microdeliberation, a kind of 
interpersonal deliberation that takes place in small, more or less bounded, groups. 
The nature of political (macro)deliberation, Kock goes on, determines the obligations 
of the participants. 
1. The debater’s main dialectical obligation is to make motivated comparisons 
between contradictory arguments.  
2. Often it is not appropriate to try to rebut, refute or deny arguments that contradict 
one’s own policy. ‘Appropriate’ in this context means: likely to serve the purpose 
of the debate, insofar as the purpose of the debate is not to achieve consensus 
between the debaters, but rather to help the third parties in their process of choice. 
3. No quantity of good arguments on one side is in itself sufficient to decide the 
matter. A comparison of the arguments on the two sides is called for, and if this 
is not offered, the third parties have still not been helped in making their own 
comparisons.  
Deliberation and argument schemes 
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Description of deliberation as an argumentative genre by Isabela Fairclough (2017, 2018) 
is consistent with the description of deliberation as a type of dialogue by Walton and 
Krabbe. Fairclough defines deliberation as a method for critical testing of alternative 
proposals for action, designed to enable for rational decision-making. Like Kock, 
Fairclough focus is on deliberation in the political field.  
Politics is inherently connected with argumentation and deliberation because it is oriented 
to decision-making, but also because the political is an institutional order whose very 
fabric gives people reasons for acting in particular ways (Fairclough 2017, p.243). 
However, she expressly points out that in politics, deliberation coexists with negotiation, 
adjudication and mediation. 
Fairclough’s main contribution is the association of the practice of deliberation 
with the use of some particular argumentation schemes. Argumentation schemes are 
patterns of reasoning that allow for the identification and appraisal of current and 
stereotypical forms of argument in everyday discourse. Although most authors use 
“current” and “stereotypical” as if they were equivalent, these two words refer to quite 
different things. The first, “current”, refers to the frequency with which these patterns 
occur in our argumentative practices, a matter for researchers in argumentative practices. 
The second, “stereotypical”, refers to the ability of participants to recognize these 
patterns. Even if this ability may be fostered by the frequent occurrence of a form of 
argument, there is a lot of other factors contributing to the saliency of an argument 
scheme. 
I think that the most promising way of understanding argument schemes is as kind 
of reasons: «An approach to the specification of meaningful kinds of reasons to construct 
arguments from is that of argument schemes, as they have been studied in argumentation 
theory» (van Eemeren et al. 2014:640). The connection of reasons to argument is that to 
argue is to present to somebody something as a reason for something else, usually for 
persuading her. Therefore, anyone who asserts P so C means that P is or expresses a 
reason for C. When this assertion is questioned, the arguer can be required to make it 
explicit that in virtue of which P is supposed to be a reason for C. A classification of the 
common answers to this kind of questions results in a classification of single arguments 
into argument schemes. 
According to Fairclough, deliberation is characterized, among other things, by the 
prevalent use of two argument schemes: argument from goals and argument from 
consequence. Roughly argument from goals run like this:  
- agent S has goal G therefore agent S ought to do A for doing act A contributes to 
goal G. 
And argument from positive and negative consequence run like this: 
- doing A has potential effects E, therefore proposal A is recommended for effects 
E are desirable 
- doing A has potential effects E, therefore A is not recommended for effects E are 
undesirable 
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Fairclough says that these argument schemes are used in different stages of the 
deliberative process. Deliberation typically starts with many agents having a stated goal 
G in a set of circumstances C and trying to jointly answer the question “what should be 
done?”. To do that they propose and critically examine possible courses of action to bring 
about G on the basis of the knowledge available to them (Fairclough 2018, pp.299-300). 
Thus, each of these proposals amounts to an argument from goal. The deliberative process 
consists of two consecutive stages. it. The purpose of the first stage is to eliminate 
unreasonable proposals by examining their potential consequences, while the purpose of 
the second stage is to enable non-arbitrary choice of a better proposal, if several 
reasonable proposals have withstood criticism. Thus, Fairclough enriches the description 
of the argumentation stage in deliberation, specifying their argument means and criticism 
and distinguishing two consecutive sub-stages. 
At the first stage overriding reasons are considered: when one of the proposals has 
some unacceptable consequence, it is ruled out. At the second stage outweighing reasons 
come into play: the pros and cons of the surviving proposals are weighed up and their 
relative merits are assessed in order to determine which proposal is preferable to other 
reasonable alternatives. This weighing is heavily influenced by fundamental differences 
of interests, purposes and values, and different ways of interpreting the situation among 
the debaters. Due to the dependence on subjective factors -Fairclough points out- 
deliberation turns almost invariably to an adversarial process. Fairclough distinguishes 
unreasonable and reasonable disagreement in politics. Reasonable disagreements occur 
when parties have equally good reasons for their proposals, that are either incomparable 
or differently weighted or prioritized. In fact, it could be argued that incomparability is a 
deeper phenomenon, not directly dependent on differences of interests and purposes, for 
the balance involved in this second stage of the deliberative process is complex and 
multidimensional, since  
Unacceptable consequences include impacts on goals which should arguably not be 
undermined (e.g., other agents’ legitimate goals), as well as impacts on arguably non-
overridable ‘deontic reasons’ such as rights and obligations (Searle 2010), arising from 
institutional facts (e.g., moral norms, laws, rules, commitments), which should act as 
constraints on what agents can reasonably choose to do (Fairclough 2017, p. 245). 
The positive and negative effects of an action are of unequal importance and each of them 
can vary in intensity. Therefore, disagreement is possible even when we agree in the 
relative ordering of values. 
Proposals and offers. 
Drawing on the work of Kock, Constanza Ihnen Jory (2016) intends to capture the 
difference between deliberation and negotiation as the two main types of dialogue on 
practical issues (i.e. about what to do). The fundamental difference is that while 
deliberative argumentation, as we have seen, is about proposals, negotiative 
argumentation is about offers. Besides that, Ihnen Jory rightly remarks that negotiations 
-unlike deliberations- not always involve argumentation. 
There are three main differences between negotiating (i.e. makings an offer) and 
deliberating (i.e. making a proposal), according to Ihnen Jory. 
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First, when a speaker makes a proposal, she predicates the same collective action 
of both speaker and hearer. To make a non-conditional offer, it is sufficient for the speaker 
to predicate an action of himself and to make a conditional offer it is sufficient for her to 
predicate an action of herself and a different action of the hearer. Eventually in this second 
case both actions can be the same, and thus it would be a collective action. In short, to 
propose is necessarily to predicate a collective action of speaker and hearer; to make an 
offer is to predicate an action from the speaker which may or may not involve mutually 
bringing it about with the hearer. 
The second difference between making an offer and proposing relates to whose 
interests are meant to be served by the action(s) that speaker (and hearer) would be 
carrying out. When a speaker makes a proposal, he is committed to the view that the 
action proposed will further an interest—goal, objective, preference, etc.—that is shared 
by both speaker and hearer. When a speaker makes an offer—non-conditional or 
conditional—he is committed to the view that his action will comply with or further, in 
varying degrees, interests that are not shared by speaker and hearer.  
The third and final difference refers to the presumed absence or existence of a 
conflict of interest. When a speaker performs a proposal, he presumes that there is an 
alignment of interests with the hearer. By contrast, the speaker who makes an offer 
(conditional or otherwise) presupposes the existence of a conflict of interests with the 
listener. It is not the presence of a conflict of interest or the presence of a set of shared 
interests as such that defines an offer or a proposal, and thus whether the exchange is an 
instance of negotiation or deliberation, but whether the action is performed to solve a 
conflict of interest or to promote shared interests.  
Further, Ihnen Jory differentiates two kinds of negotiation. In a distributive 
negotiation the participants assume that what is at stake is the distribution of a fixed 
amount of some good; by contrast, integrative negotiations take place when the 
participants search for a solution where both can maximize their gains simultaneously. In 
a distributive negotiation, the offer is made in order to solve a conflict between the 
interests of the participants by trying to reach a compromise somewhere between their 
interests. In an integrative negotiation, the offer is performed to solve a conflict between 
the interests of the participants by trying to fulfil the parties’ convergent interests, which 
are neither shared nor in conflict. 
What I want to stress is that, according to Ihnen Jory, deliberation differs from 
negotiation because it always involves collective action that serves a shared interest and 
presupposes a community of interests. 
Deliberation and collective agency 
Luis Vega agrees with Kock on the distinctive features of public deliberation, even if he 
does not dismiss reaching consensus as the proper goal of this argumentative practice 
(Vega 2013, p. 122; 2018, p.4). Summarizing: 
1) Deliberation starts from the recognition of an issue of public interest whose 
resolution often includes conflicts or alternatives among several possible options 
or concurrent parties. 
2) Discussion involves proposals, not only propositions.  
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3) Proposals involve balances and preferences that rest on opposed heterogeneous 
considerations with different relative weighs, which may result in complex 
multimensional inferences. 
4) Proposals, allegations and reasons under consideration are intended to induce the 
consensual achievement of results of general interest. The search of consensus 
expresses an orientation towards a common interest or goal, apart from or above 
personal or private interests of the participants. 
5) The goal of the deliberation is to take decision within a specified time: when we 
engage in deliberation, it is neither for the pleasure of deliberating, nor to 
indefinitely defer a decision. 
To develop a consensualist model of deliberative argumentation Vega distinguishes three 
forms of argumentative agency, to associate deliberation with collective agency, a notion 
based on Toumela’s (2007) We mode. These are individual agency, plural agency and 
collective agency. 
When agency is individual, a commitment is assumed and cancelled by personal 
choice. A person is under a personal commitment if and only if she is solely responsible 
for the assumed commitment, and she in entitled to cancel the commitment. That is, 
individual agency is a mode I of agency. 
Plural agency is formed through the association of many individuals by 
coincidence of interests or points of view, or by the circumstances of the given situation. 
Plural agency is then formed by aggregation of individual agencies. Thus, in plural agency 
individuals function as a private person in a group context. 
Finally, collective agency results from confrontation of options and public 
deliberation in a group acting towards a common goal or towards a joint resolution. It 
involves strong commitments that no member of the group is unilaterally entitled to 
cancel. So, it is a We mode of agency.  
Since argumentation is a communicative interaction that requires the participation 
of many agents, argumentative practices may run either with a plural agency or with a 
collective agency. In fact, it is tempting to pair these two forms of agency with the two 
main forms of practical dialogue or argumentation activity types: negotiation and 
deliberation, respectively. This is so because negotiation seems to require plural agency, 
since interests are particular in nature, whilst deliberation, as understood by Vega, rests 
upon the recognition of a common good, and hence presupposes some form of collective 
intentionality and agency. 
However Vega’s thesis of the collective agency of deliberation can be interpreted 
either as the thesis that any exercise of public deliberation requires a collective agency 
(strong interpretation), or as the thesis that collective deliberation is a species of the genus 
public deliberation, which also includes plural deliberation (weak interpretation). In fact, 
Vega’s characterization of public deliberation can be interpreted both ways. Vega says 
that public deliberation is characterized, among other things, by the recognition of an 
issue of common interest in the public domain, and by the purpose of inducing the 
consensual and reasonably motivated achievement of results of general interest. The 
terms “common” and “general” may refer either to every one of the members of the group 
taken individually, as a species of sum, or may refer to them as members of a group. Thus 
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a “general interest” may refer to an interest generalized among the members of the group, 
or to a group interest, an interest anyone has as a member of that group.   
Vega’s talk of “groups capable of becoming deliberative groups” (Vega 2018, 
p.18) suggests that not all groups are endowed with this capacity, and favors the weak 
interpretation, as does the assertion that 
A characteristic virtue of public deliberation is just to turn individuals debating about 
some resolution into effective members of a collective, and, even more, to turn 
individuals affected by a common problem into agents involved in its effective 
resolution (Op.cit., p. 26). 
But even if we were to adopt a wide interpretation of public deliberation, it seems clear 
that Vega holds that collective deliberation is the model for public deliberation, in the 
double sense of “model” -i.e. archetype and example for imitation or emulation. In this 
sense, collective agency lies at the core of deliberation. 
Henceforth, I will reserve “deliberative group” for collective deliberation, using 
“deliberative progroup” for plural deliberation (following Tuomela 2007, p. 46). 
Deliberation in the We mode. 
Therefore, participants in collective deliberation do not act as private individuals, but as 
members of a group, which entails a certain degree of depersonalization. As it has been 
stressed by John Turner in self-categorization theory, depersonalization is not a loss of 
self, but rather a redefinition of the self in terms of group membership. Being a member 
presupposes a mutually recognized commitment bond to the group ethos and a social 
commitment to the other group members relative to promote the group ethos. Hence 
thinking and acting as a group member amounts to thinking and acting for a group reason, 
rather than for an individual reason.  
Thinking and acting in the we-mode basically amounts to thinking and acting for a group 
reason, that is, to a group member’s taking the group’s views and commitments as his 
authoritative reasons for thinking and acting as the group ‘‘requires’’ or in accordance 
with what ‘‘favors’’ the group (namely, its goals, etc.) (Tuomela 2007, p.14). 
Since arguing has been defined presenting to someone something as a reason for 
something else, the concept of group reasons seems essential for a proper understanding 
of collective deliberation. 
Tuomela (2007, p.16) defines the ethos of a group as “the set of the constitutive 
goals, values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions that give the group 
motivating reasons for action”. The ethos directs the group members’ thoughts and 
actions toward what is important for the group and is generally expected to benefit it, and 
thus defines the common good. It is just the search of the common good what 
differentiates deliberation from negotiation as forms of argumentation, in that the latter is 
geared towards the reconciliation of private interests given in advance and independently 
from the constitution of the group. 
It can be assumed, at least to a certain point, that individual agents, and thus plural 
agents formed by mere aggregation of them, are given in advance and independently of 
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the deliberation process, but it seems that the same does not always hold for collective 
agents. In such cases, where does the “we” presupposed as a condition of possibility for 
collective deliberation come from? The most plausible answer is that the required “we” 
is built up during the course of the deliberation process itself. These considerations lead 
to the conclusion that deliberation, and argumentation in general, is also a means of 
shaping collective identities. Otherwise, this hypothesis is consistent with Tuomela’s talk 
of collectively constructed group reasons (e.g. 2007, p.3). 
Robert Asen (2005) ranges identity formation among the important functions 
argumentation may play in the public sphere. It is obvious that argumentation, like other 
communicative practices, influences how participants understand themselves and the 
others, creating for the participants a sense of self and others. 
To recognize the identity formation function of argument is to recognize that discourse 
situates people in social relations. Argument takes on a performative dimension as the 
articulation of a viewpoint bolsters the identity conveyed in one's propositional 
statement (Asen 2005, p. 132). 
Although identity -or better, identification- has been given great attention in rhetoric, I 
would like to propose a slightly different approach here. I hold that a deliberative group 
(i.e., groups capable of becoming collective agents in deliberation) is a group in the sense 
of Tajfel & Turner (1986, p.15): “a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to 
be members of the same category, share some emotional involvement in this common 
definition of themselves and achieve some degree of social consensus about the 
evaluation of their group and their membership in it”. If this is so, a deliberative group is 
defined not only by some shared set of more or less objective characteristics, but rather 
by its members’ awareness of belonging to the same group and the value and emotional 
significance they attach to this membership. In this sense, a deliberative group is an 
emotional community. 
A social group exists, and deliberative groups are no exception in this regard, 
when individuals recognize each other as members of the same group. This mutual 
recognition is a cognitive process that involves a certain depersonalization, since the 
subject minimizes the differences within the group (in-group) and magnifies the 
differences with the opposite groups (out-groups). When a person categorizes himself as 
part of a deliberative group, he ceases to perceive himself as someone unique and different 
from the rest, with his own particular interests, and perceives himself as a member of the 
group. This process is based on the association of positively valued characteristics with 
the deliberative in-group (such as reasonableness), which are supposed to be a distinctive 
characteristic of the group, differentiating its members from those that are not, thus 
generating a feeling of superiority. 
A further consequence of the claim that deliberative groups are groups in the sense 
of social identity theory is that the sense of belonging to the group, and the fear of being 
excluded from it, are part of the “normative cement that serves as a basis for legitimizing, 
authorizing and, where appropriate, sanctioning the actions of the members” (Vega 2018, 
p.18). It has been often observed that there is a tendency to debate only with like-minded 
people (specially in on-line deliberations), and sometimes this is denounced as a 
perversion of public reasons. However, if I am right and deliberation is a means for 
shaping collective identities, this tendency is not an accident, but something inscribed in 
its very nature.  
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Reasons in collective deliberation are group reasons, reasons constructed for the 
members of a group defined by a common ethos and mutual recognition, and, as a result, 
that only can be acknowledged by those who recognize themselves and are recognized by 
the other members as members of the group. Perhaps it could be said that reasonableness 
thus becomes,  from the point of view of deliberative agents, an in-group identity marker, 
instead of a marker of the universal audience, which “consists of the whole of mankind, 
or at least, of all normal, adult persons”, according to Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969, 
p. 30). Thus, it seems that acknowledgement of collective deliberation requires 
abandoning the ideal of universal audience as a definitory construct of reasonableness. 
Kock argues that consensus cannot be the goal of deliberative argumentation, since 
weighing reasons is an essential part of it and it requires arranging values into some scale.  
The difficulty, according to Kock, is that while we can construct scales using a variety of 
criteria, there is no intersubjectively compelling reasons to prioritize one of these over the 
other. Given that any balance of reasons in order to take a decision will be done giving 
the priority to some particular criterion or set of criteria, deliberation involves a subjective 
element beyond the control of argument. If the ethos of a deliberative group is a 
hierarchical system goals, values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions 
that give the group motivating reasons for action, the intersubjective validity of the 
decision reached through deliberation is warranted into the deliberative group, and so is 
the possibility of consensus. Of course, this validity and the corresponding consensus are 
tied to the identity of the group, and therefore have no independent standing. 
Identity negotiation. 
I would like to suggest further that the process by which the participants come to see 
themselves as members of a deliberative group, and to act in consequence, is a process of 
identity negotiation (Goffman 1959; Swann 1983). Identity negotiation refers to a broad 
set of processes through which people strike a balance between achieving their interaction 
goals and satisfying their identity-related goals, such as needs for agency, communion 
and psychological coherence (Swann & Bosson 1992, p. 449). Through identity 
negotiation participants reach agreements regarding "who is who" in their argumentative 
exchange. Once these agreements are reached, participants are expected to remain faithful 
to the identities they have agreed to assume. The process of identity negotiation 
establishes what participants can expect of one another, and thus provides the 
interpersonal "glue" that holds relationships together. There are two competing forces in 
identity negotiation. On the one hand, every participant tries that the others verify and 
confirm her self-conceptions (self-verification); on the other hand, the other participants 
try to make her to behave in ways that confirm their expectancies (behavioral 
confirmation). If I am right, since identity is situational and negotiated, some moves in a 
deliberation dialogue should be properly understood as speaker’s attempts to bring the 
others to see him and themselves as members of a group. The very possibility of 
deliberation depends on the success of these manoeuvres. Research indicates that when 
members of small groups receive self-verification from other group members, their 
commitment to the group increases and performance improves (Swann &Buhrmester 
2012, p. 414). 
In the pragmadialectical model of critical discussion, identity negotiation should be 
place at the opening stage. For identity negotiation to fit into the opening stage, a more 
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comprehensive characterization of this stage is needed. According to the standard 
account, 
In the opening stage the parties decide to try to resolve the difference of opinion. They 
assign the roles of protagonist and antagonist (in a mixed difference, there are two 
protagonists and two antagonists). They also agree on the rules for the discussion and 
on the starting points. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 25) 
Here the assigned roles are dialectical roles, regulated by the conventions of the 
argumentative exchange and voluntarily assumed by the participants; but when we come 
to identity negotiation, identity is the non-conventional result of social interactions, 
modeled by the expectancies and behavioral responses of the participants. 
Conclusion 
Deliberation is a type of argumentative practice in which several agents must jointly 
choose from several alternatives, that either may be given in advance or may be built in 
the course of the dialogue, the best available course of action for the group as a whole. I 
have argued that in archetypical deliberation participants act as group members and 
handle group reasons. Here “group” means a collection of individuals who share a 
common identification of themselves. Acting and perceiving oneself as a group member 
involves a certain depersonalization, since the subject ceases to perceive himself as 
someone unique and different from the rest, with his or her own particular interests, and 
perceives himself as a member of the group. A basic motivation of self-categorization is 
the pursuit of positive self-esteem, which is achieved through comparison between the in-
group and relevant out-groups. As far as deliberation is concerned, this process is based 
on the association of positively valued characteristics such as reasonableness or open-
mindedness with the in-group. In this way, the construction of a group identity and a 
collective agency, which is part of the deliberative process itself, allows to overcome in 
the search of consensus the subjectivity of the weighing of practical reasons that is 
inherent in public deliberation. 
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